

Psychosocial approaches to radicalisation

2021

CORE LIBRARY

REPORT

Why we need an integrated psychosocial approach to extremism

CORE Library's analysis of radicalisation takes a holistic psycho-social approach, combining understandings based in social psychology and the group dynamics or radicalisation with the cognitive aspects of radical and extreme belief systems.



Contents

Introduction	4
The psychosocial approach.....	5
Psychosocial concepts.....	8
Radicalisation	9
False beliefs.....	9
Trauma and uncertainty.....	11
Identities.....	13
Retention	15
Values.....	15
Group think.....	16
Collective identities.....	18
Implications	20
Bibliography	22

Photo by Levi Meir Clancy on Unsplash



Introduction

Radicalisation is defined by the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Social Security (2014) as:

a process whereby a person increasingly accepts the use of violence to achieve political, ideological or religious goals.

The use of violence by radicalised persons is likely to be deliberate and purposive, justified by ideological objectives and involving a group or the presence of a supportive mass movement.

As the first in the series, this paper will present the value of a psychosocial approach which combines psychological and social insights into radicalisation, then outline various psychosocial processes in play during radicalisation. These insights will underpin the topics discussed in subsequent thematic papers by CORE Library.

All of CORE Library’s content will aim towards an integrated understanding of radicalisation.

As Tahir Abbas observes:

Virtually all of the young people who variously enter into the theatre of radicalisation and violence do so due to emotional, psychological, ideological, and sociological factors. Measures targeting such acts of crime must recognise the multi-layered nature of the processes involved in radicalisation, and hence introduce more joined-up policy thinking at a much earlier stage of the process. (2020)

Measures targeting such acts of crime must recognise the multi-layered nature of the processes involved in radicalisation.

The psychosocial approach

De la Corte writes ‘neither the individual psychology of terrorists, nor the social environments provide a complete explanation of why individuals become involved in terrorism’ (de la Corte, 2007). This shows the importance of psychosocial theories of radicalisation.

Human beings are social animals; our relationships are core to our identities and well-being.

Human beings are social animals; our relationships are core to our identities and well-being. Psychosocial analysis focuses up self-understanding and social relationships. Psychosocial theories of terrorism offer a rich explanatory framework for researchers, law enforcement and policymakers (Bjørge, 2005; de la Corte, 2007). This is particularly relevant for the study of acts motivated by feelings of grievance and frustration such as hate crimes and terrorism.

Research into radicalisation and extremism has long focussed upon broader societal phenomena rather than the individual. For instance, there have been many attempts at establishing connections between poverty and/or a lack of opportunity with vulnerability to extremist violence. However, research does not tend to support a direct causal relationship between poverty (Blair et al., 2013), or a lack of education (Krasenberg & Wouterse, 2019) with extremism.

In Britain, for instance, three well-educated, middle-class British schoolgirls travelled to Syria to join the so-called Islamic State together (Dodd & Khomani, 2015); a medical doctor and an engineer planned a suicide attack together (The Scotsman, 2008). This does not imply that there is no relationship whatsoever, but that it is complex.

Early attempts to understand extremism within the psychological sphere tended to look for psycho-pathologies of perpetrators, in search of diagnosable mental health conditions. McCauley (2002) points out that, in fact, extremist groups tend to be tightly organised and reliant upon predictable behaviour amongst its members - for good reasons:

Your life depends on the others in your group. Would you want someone in your group suffering from some kind of psychopathology? Someone who cannot be depended on, someone out of touch with reality?

Persons with certain neuropsychiatric conditions may certainly be at risk of radicalisation (Krasenberg & Wouterse, 2019), specifically self-radicalisation. They are less likely to be involved in collective radicalisation due to a reduced capacity to function in groups, particularly those with a requirement for discipline and secrecy. While a few individuals with serious mental illness have committed terrorist attacks, these tend to be small-scale attacks perpetrated autonomously in comparison by those organised by groups, and their impacts are comparatively marginal - although dangerously unpredictable.

It has been argued that terrorism and extremism were rational choices: 'the decision to become a terrorist and commit terrorist acts is influenced by factors in the environment, and that the actor is a rational one who responds and reacts to these environmental factors.' (Steven & Gunaratna, 2004).

Martha Crenshaw (1985) suggests that there are at least four categories of motivation among terrorists:

- the opportunity for action;
- the need to belong;
- the desire for social status;
- the acquisition of material reward.

Humans very rarely make choices based upon dispassionate reasoning (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). What appears to be a rational response to one person may not be so to another. Our personalities, experiences, values, identities, cultures, perceptions and beliefs influence our priorities, strategies, choices and actions. People who are highly aggressive often have an inability to develop and deploy non-aggressive solutions to conflicts. They may also feel a heightened sense of risk during interactions with others. For them, violence may appear to be a rational response, given their understanding of their situation even though it would not occur to another person to be so.

Radicalisation can be understood as a dual process: the cognitive aspect, in which radical attitudes, beliefs and values are acquired, and the behavioural, in which the individual becomes engaged in radical activities. While this might suggest a progression from ideas to action, it is also the case that social involvement with radicalised persons can lead to the adoption of radical beliefs. Many individuals absorb radical beliefs through interactions with family or friend groups.

Cognitive and behavioural radicalisation frequently coexist but are not identical. Many individuals hold radical beliefs; few of these are at risk of perpetrating political violence (Marone, 2017).

This level of complexity suggests that a productive approach to radicalisation must be based in interactions between social and

Many individuals hold radical beliefs; few of these are at risk of perpetrating political violence.

psychological phenomena. There has been no psychological theory which explains all types of violence, including terrorism; but pathways into and out of terrorist engagement can be illuminated by an understanding of psychological and sociological concepts. This paper will outline some of these concepts, phenomena and interactions as an introduction to subsequent reports. CORE's further reports will focus on more bounded topic areas within the study of radicalisation and extremism.

None of these concepts
are unique to extremists:
they are part of the

None of the concepts discussed in this document are in any way unique to extremists: they are in fact, part of the psychological make-up of every individual. One of the key insights of CORE's psychosocial approach is that there is no specific or unique mindset of a potential terrorist, extremist or radical; perhaps every single one of us, under the right conditions, has the capacity to become radicalised, at least to some degree.

Psychosocial concepts

The concepts introduced in this document have been divided into two sections: *radicalisation*, the factors which induce people to join extremist groups, and *retention*, those which prevent them from leaving. These are relevant to understand the related tasks of preventing people from becoming drawn into extremist groups, and de-radicalising those people who have already adopted extreme beliefs.

Radicalisation

The most common vulnerabilities to radicalisation are:

- the perception of injustice, humiliation and shame;
- a search for identity, and;
- a desire for belonging (Borum, 2004)

This section will discuss the roles of false beliefs, trauma and anxiety, and identity in radicalisation.

False beliefs

The so-called Information Age is one in which people often struggle to gain accurate information. The overwhelming quantity of data available can be confusing in itself.

The flood of digital information - data and facts and charts and memes and hashtags and thought-pieces and infographics and retweets is not making us more informed and thoughtful. It's making us more susceptible to nonsense, more emotional, more irrational, and more mobbish. (Bartlett, 2018)

People are far more likely to reinforce a belief when challenged than question it. This is particularly likely if they have emotional or social reasons to hold that belief. The internet provides a wealth of evidence to support any position, with abundant false news, propaganda and lies. The eruption of QAnon conspiracy theories around the impeachment of Donald Trump (Wending, 2021) shows the proliferation - and power - of misinformation. This is not all conducted via social media; the mainstream media is also implicated in circulating misinformation.

For instance, the media frequently promotes 'risk narratives' around refugees, the welfare state and security (Grusin, 2010; Jackson et al., 2011; Vultee & Balzacq, 2010), creating anxiety and a sense of powerlessness within its audience.

The proliferation of media outlets and alternative ways of obtaining information, creates different epistemic universes, where people have vastly divergent understandings of the reality of a situation. This is ground in via repetition: for instance, constant media coverage of traumatic events also increase feelings of anxiety (American Psychological Association, 2017). 'With 24-hour news networks and conversations with friends, family and other connections on social media, it's hard to avoid the constant stream of stress around issues of national concern,' says APA's chief executive officer.

Populist leaders may deliberately provoke feelings of insecurity by emphasising threats and failures, and stressing the deviance of out-groups in order to position themselves as the solution. Trump's demonisation of South American immigrants - 'When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best...They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists.' - is a clear and well-known example of leveraging a crisis narrative to support populism (Gabbatt, 2015).

Humans find a sense of meaning within the shared meaning-making of a community or culture. Within an interconnected and multicultural world, these world-views often come into contact with each other. Sometimes this leads to friction. Becoming aware that other people do not share our beliefs and expectations causes doubt.

Trauma and uncertainty

A distressing incident is likely to create a vulnerability to extremist ideas (van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2019). For instance, a sense of insignificance stemming from uncertainty or trauma can drive an individual into a search for meaning (Kruglanski et al., 2014). Former neo-Nazi Shannon Foley Martinez relates her vulnerability to extreme right-wing ideology with the trauma she experienced as a survivor of gang-rape (Tabachnick, 2019).

Wiktorowicz (2005) coined this type of vulnerability a ‘cognitive opening’, meaning that a catalytic event – often a personal crisis – makes an individual receptive to worldviews which they would not have entertained otherwise. Patty Hearst, for instance, experienced severe trauma while held hostage by the Symbionese Liberation Army, and came to support their cause to the extent that she willingly committed crimes in their name (Benjamin, 2020).

Questionnaire research with 90 white supremacists found significant evidence of far more difficult childhoods than in the general population. Interviews suggested that traumatic early experiences had given rise to negative emotions and maladaptive coping behaviours (Windisch et al., 2020). Invasive and callous parenting, for instance, can give rise to lower implicit self-esteem, which is linked to narcissism.

Unmanageable stress in childhood – such as experiences of abuse, neglect, violence, carers with addictions – can lead to ‘toxic stress’ (Koehler, 2020). A toxic stressful childhood leads to the expectation that the world is unpredictable and dangerous, and hence towards ideologies and movements that promise the exertion of control.

Difficult childhoods can lead to emotional dysregulation, where individuals cannot deal with their emotional pain in productive ways, and instead lash out at others.

Experiences do not have to be experienced directly to cause a sense of trauma. Secondary Traumatic Stress can also be experienced via first and second-hand contact with other people's trauma. It can occur when an individual identifies very closely with a victimised group. Although the trauma is felt vicariously, it can still lead to the adoption of extreme belief systems in response. Victimisation narratives have been core to Al Qaeda's materials (Mostofa, 2019), for instance.

Individuals who feel themselves to be insecure are more likely to support conservative positions.

Multiple studies have shown that individuals who feel themselves to be insecure are more likely to support conservative positions rather than those which favour change and greater equality (Jost & Napier, 2011). Cognitive closure, meaning the desire to avoid confusion or ambiguity, has been linked with support for illiberal policies as well as stereotyping (Merolla et al., 2011). People with a high need for cognitive closure both tend to seize on information quickly, and stick to their understanding rigidly in the face of challenges (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). 'The absolutist, 'black and white' nature of most extremist ideologies is often attractive to those who feel overwhelmed by the complexity and stress of navigating a complicated world,' writes Randy Borum (2010).

[T]he discomfort of uncertainty is reduced primarily by feeling able to trust some information as being true and relying on it as a basis for allowing one to 'know' what to expect and what to do. It is for this reason that ideological belief and value systems can be so attractive under uncertainty, why group membership and influence can play such a crucial role in uncertainty reduction, and why some kinds of groups and group structures can be better suited to the job than others. (Hogg & Blaylock, 2011)

Stereotyping of out-groups involves the minimisation of their humanity. We readily believe that people within out-groups experience similar primary emotions such as pain, but are less likely to believe that they can feel the sensations of more human, secondary emotions, such as shame or hope (Cuddy et al., 2008). We are also more likely to dehumanise people when we feel responsible for crimes against them (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Landau et al., 2011), in order to diffuse our own sense of guilt.

By classifying individuals as less than human we remove the taboos against harming them. Demonisation increases the dehumanisation of an outgroup further, casting maltreatment of a demonised out-group as a moral good. These are the processes whereby an extremist becomes able to switch off their empathy and actively harm others.

Those whose lives have been disrupted by trauma may engage in a 'quest for significance' as a way of dealing with uncertainty and finding a sense of meaning. The clear ideological messaging of extremist groups can provide that sense of purpose.

Identities

Feeling insecure about or distressed one's own identity is a discomfoting experience. When individuals cannot address their basic psychological needs directly, they find ways to compensate. A sense of an insecure or spoiled identity can create a powerful motivation to categorise oneself with a group as a way to shore up self-esteem. In particular, Muslim societies have seen a growing insecurity around their beliefs, practices and identities under the influence of globalisation (Moghaddam & Love, 2011) which may be shown in terms of increasing radicalisation, and the adoption of extreme religious identities.

The kind of groups which most effectively address the feeling of insecurity are those which are homogeneous, rigidly structured and clearly defined. By extrapolation, the most keenly felt insecurity may lead to zealous identification with groups which are orthodox, hierarchical, rigidly ideological and intolerant of dissent (Hogg, 2000). Extremist groups have distinct us-and-them boundaries, and value uniformity in attitudes, values, customs – and even appearances. Shaved heads, or long beards are the most clearly visible signifiers.

Many of the recruits to extremist movements are adolescents and young adults, particularly males; many extremist organisations deliberately channel recruitment efforts towards young people (Koehler, 2020). Adolescence involves the restructuring of the brain. This process can result in feelings of anhedonia, dysphoria and anxiety during this phase of development. These negative states of mind can lead teenagers to take part on high-risk behaviours (Andersen & Teicher, 2009). Adolescent identities are unformed and unstable, and as such the lure of strong group identities is at its strongest amongst the young. Young people have also been shown to be more ready to engage in risky behaviour in order to gain inclusion and status within a social group (Siegel et al., 2011). This may indicate a stronger likelihood in engaging in violence.

Identities which cross boundaries may also feel less stable. For instance, Muslim youth in the West might feel ‘inauthentic’ if they feel unable to develop satisfactory Western/hybrid identities, and therefore develop an extreme Islamic identity which fulfils their need for an authentic identity (Moghaddam, 2006).

Amin Maalouf (2001) notes that while people often hold multiple, intersecting identities, when a person feels they are threatened upon on axis of their identity, they become more invested in that identification,

and more likely to respond defensively to the threat. A threatened identity becomes more salient to the individual, and is more likely to become sacralised.

Retention

Trauma, misinformation and a search for a sense of identity drive individuals towards extreme beliefs and then membership membership in extremist groups. Once in a group, the psycho-social landscape changes. This section will outline the roles of shared values, group think and collective identities in keeping an individual tied to an extremist group.

Values

Collective identities provide a normative backdrop to behaviour within the in-group. Extreme identities form around in-group cohesion — and out-group hostility. The individual learns to take their values from the collective, and to disregard values which originate from outside the group. A ‘resistance identity’ can develop, where the individual bases their entire sense of self around in opposition to a presumed enemy. The role of charismatic leaders can also become a focus for shared values. Confident people are both more charismatic and also more prone to radicalisation. Groups may coalesce around leaders who are more likely to increase a group’s extremism than diminish it. In fact, the removal of an extreme leader will tend to reduce antisocial behaviour within the group as a whole (Donovan & Coupe, 2013).

Religion has long provided a form of solace and a sense of justice within a harsh world. Religion can therefore become a narrative which

addresses grievances and provides a model for seeking redress. The intersection of extremism with religion reinforces pre-existing negative stereotypes against minorities, and position particular groups as a locus of extremism (Aly, 2015; Stets & Burke, 2000), which disrupts social cohesion (Spalek & Imtoul, 2007; Spalek & Lambert, 2008). Yet, any ideology can act as a vehicle for group bonding, whether these are political, religious, or social. Many ideologies can be used to legitimise group acts of violence. The nature of the group and the dynamics within it are far more salient in predicting the involvement in extremist violence than the ideology it espouses (Aly, 2011; Juergensmeyer, 2003).

'Sacred values' are particularly linked with radicalisation. Sacred values have no material goals. They are essential, spiritual and/or core values, although not necessarily religious in origin. They are not, however, based on rational principles (Atran & Ginges, 2012) meaning they are highly resistant to compromise or challenge. Religious, political and moral beliefs are the most likely to be 'sacred.' Those who share these 'sacred' values will be more likely to cooperate with others who have the same position, as well as more likely to oppose outsiders. They are also more likely to use violence in support of those values. When individuals feel that they are socially marginalised, they are more likely to double down by 'sacralising' their values (Pretus et al., 2018).

Religious, political and moral beliefs are the most likely to be 'sacred.'

Group think

Conformity is an important source of social order but it can also lead to antisocial behaviours. Within radicalised groups, conformity enforces and protects the ideas and values of the group. An individual is less likely to be influenced by a member of an out-group. In fact, they might be hostile to an idea simply because it has been raised by an outsider (Maoz et al., 2002). On the other hand, groups influence individuals; they are unlikely to challenge the collective opinion even when they do not share it.

Within groups, micro-cultures establish a distinct set of moral and behavioural standards (Denoeux & Carter, 2009, pp. 77–78; Schillinger, 2016, p. 343) This is why organisations such as Islamists which have a military structure are more likely to promote violence than those which are less structured, such as environmentalists. There is less of a margin for dissent within authoritarian structures than there is in structures which are operated loosely on democratic or anarchist principles. Authority comes to overshadow conscience.

Predictability and routine through the development of rigid structures of behaviour within the group soothes anxiety. People who feel that the world is unjust and threatening are particularly likely to appreciate rigid structures which provide a sense of security.

People who feel that the world is unjust and threatening are particularly likely to appreciate rigid structures which provide a sense of security.

When like-minded people talk to one another, they usually end up reinforcing each other's ideas. If status is conferred upon individuals who best express the ideology of the group, then those who express it with the most conviction will become leaders, and the tendency of the group will tend to become more extreme.

When they start out at an extreme point and are placed in a group of like-minded people, they are likely to go especially far in the direction with which they started,' says Sunstein (2019).

Moral disengagement can emerge from a 'displacement of responsibility' either through locating the perpetration of crimes as following orders, or as justified revenge for previous slights (Denoeux & Carter, 2009; Stets & Burke, 2000). These are factors that can lead to a radicalised group becoming violent.

Collective identities

Just as an insecure sense of identity might draw a person into a radical group, so does a collective sense of group identity increase engagement.

Crenshaw (1988) argues, ‘for the individuals who become active terrorists, the initial attraction is often to the group, or community of believers, rather than to an abstract ideology or to violence.’ Marc Sageman states that close to 90% of Jihadis join through friendship and kinship networks (2004).

In an individual, narcissism involves a grandiose sense of self-importance. However, this grandiosity is in itself a form of vulnerability, as the narcissist may feel haunted by the fear that his sense of self is distorted, and that the ‘true self’ does not measure up to the image the narcissist wishes to present. Collective narcissism within a group exhibits as ‘grandiosity, self-importance, envy, arrogance, haughtiness, entitlement, excessive admiration, lack of empathy, fantasies of unlimited success and feelings of special/unique/high status (Hogg, 2011). This can also boost self-esteem: groups which regard themselves as superior – whether this is due to faith, race or any other characteristic – give a sense of pride which may be particularly valuable to individuals with a low sense of self-worth.

Similarly, the utopianism of some extreme ideologies a displacement fantasy for a world that is disappointing and confusing - and a sense of significance and purpose. This sense of vulnerability can be transmuted into group loyalties, where the members share a grandiose sense of importance. Narcissistic rage – that which emerges from a sense of injury to the self - may present a high risk of violence.

Social identities (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) can boost group norms to the extent that they overrule an individual's conscience. Extremist groups develop strong social identities. These include fixating upon, and exaggerating the differences between the in-group and the out-group, isolating their members from other viewpoints, cultivating a sense of victimhood, rejecting or sabotaging peaceful activism, acclaiming violent behaviours, manipulating members' emotions, and offering a utopian vision to justify violence. With some groups enforcing strict codes of behaviour, individual choices – and hence individual responsibilities – are reduced.

When values become considered 'sacred', decisions are not processed through the mechanisms of logic; they are beyond question or compromise. Such 'sacred values' mean that certain beliefs are not held on any rational basis, and are resistant to challenge.

Groups which have undergone collective trauma – whether experienced first-hand or through accounts, or even a traumatising bonding ritual – develop particularly deep bonds, where the individual's identity effectively becomes fused with the group. Depersonalisation (Stets & Burke, 2000) occurs where individuals see themselves as the embodiment of the archetypical group member. This sense of having an identity which is overshadowed by the group is particularly likely to lead to compliance, including in terrorist attacks.

Implications

Terrorism wins only if you respond to it in the way the terrorists want you to; which means that its fate is in your hands and not in theirs. (Fromkin, 1975)

[P]eople living during times of widespread social upheaval (eg, eras of colonisation, rapid modernization) or economic instability may have difficulty believing that the local standards for obtaining personal value are operating properly, or may be uncertain as to what those standards are in a world of change and confusion. (Landau et al., 2011)

Although the focus of this report has been upon interactions at the individual and group level, this does not mean that political interventions are useless. The political, economic and social environment have an impact upon people's susceptibility to extremism, particularly when they create situations of uncertainty.

The Great Depression of the 1930s gave rise to a shift towards fascism, ultranationalism and communism - and a world war in which as many as 78 million people were killed. The financial collapse of 2008 has, more recently, stimulated a wave of populism across Europe. A study of financial crises from 1870-2014 found that they tended to increase polarisation and a swing towards the far-right, and more violent political activism (Funke et al., 2016).

The impacts of the global Covid-19 pandemic are yet to be measured in full, but are likely to herald a new crisis in mental health which holds

potential for social disruption. Already, the growing popularity of QAnon, a baroque conspiracy theory developed online, demonstrates the psychological vulnerabilities which have developed over the pandemic period.

Simultaneously, financial crises will tend to erode the social fabric. A depleted social network is more likely to allow vulnerable individuals to slip between the cracks. A responsive social network should have the ability to detect persons who are vulnerable to radicalisation and intervene effectively. An early social and therapeutic intervention into the chaotic life of Jeremy Joseph Christian, who suffered from multiple undiagnosed mental illnesses (Wilson, 2017) might have prevented the triple murders he committed on Portland's public transport system.

The radicalisation of a psychologically troubled individual should be counted as a failure of that society to support its vulnerable members. A lack of access to support means that people who have experienced distressing and traumatising events may be unable to obtain help in a timely manner. This would have social benefits beyond reducing the number of people vulnerable to radicalisation.

If a personal crisis can provoke a search for meaning and a cognitive opening for radicalisation, we should also be asking why the community was not able provide appropriate support during to mitigate that crisis. If poor parenting can lead to insecurity and attitudes conducive to aggression, we should ask what needs to be done to support healthy parenting habits and to ensure children are allowed to flourish. If young people feel disengaged from their communities then we need to ask what should be done to build inclusion. Just as the practice of domestic homicide reviews have revealed that in almost cases, each death is indicated by many failures to intervene in a timely fashion, we can also consider which interventions would have addressed the vulnerabilities of a person who has become radicalised.

More broadly, post-Industrial labour patterns are characterised by precarity, meaning that there is prevalence of temporary, flexible, contingent, casual and intermittent work which undermines the feeling of personal security, alongside the erosion of the welfare state under austerity measures and the sense of community support available in earlier eras. Standing (2011) describes a diverse demographic who are ‘floating, rudderless and potentially angry, capable of veering to the extreme right or extreme left politically...backing populist demagoguery that plays on their fears or phobias.’ He points to the ‘four As’ – anger, anomie, anxiety and alienation – as characteristic of the experience of precarity.

The Covid-19 pandemic has peaked a pre-existing global mental health crisis (Saxena & Bhattacharya, 2020). Levels of depression, anxiety, loneliness and unhappiness have spiked. The commonplace psychological conditions of depression, anxiety and dysthymia have been linked with support for extremism (Bhui et al., 2020).

Existential threats, such as pandemics of the potential for catastrophic climate change, increase the ambient stress of life. This occurs when people are increasingly disillusioned by mainstream politics, shown by the falling number of people voting, and the increasing numbers attracted to populism, and who are disengaged and frustrated with existing societal structures. In this sense, extremism is just the indicator of a deeper political malaise.

It is essential to build an inclusive culture which fulfils the psycho-sociological needs of all citizens to disrupt the patterns of radicalisation. This includes building a more compassionate and inclusive politics which attends to the social and psychological wellbeing of citizens.

Bibliography

- Abbas, T. (2020). Far-Right and Islamic Radicalisation in an Age of Austerity: A Review of Sociological Trends and Implications for Policy. ICCT. <https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2020/01/TahirAbbasAusterity.pdf>
- Aly, A. (2015). Countering Violent Extremism. In B. Baker-Beall, C. Heath-Kelly, & L. Jarvis, Counter-Radicalisation: Critical perspectives (pp. 71–87). Routledge.
- Aly, Anne. (2011). Terrorism and Global Security: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan.
- American Psychological Association. (2017, November 1). APA Stress in America™ Survey: US at ‘lowest point we can remember;’ future of nation most commonly reported source of stress. <https://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2017/11/lowest-point>
- Andersen, S. L., & Teicher, M. H. (2009). Desperately driven and no brakes: Developmental stress exposure and subsequent risk for substance abuse. *Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews*, 33(4), 516–524. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2008.09.009>
- Atran, S., & Ginges, J. (2012). Religious and Sacred Imperatives in Human Conflict. *Science*, 336(6083), 855–857. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1216902>
- Bartlett, J. (2018). Radicals. Windmill Books.
- Benjamin, K. (2020, June 1). What The 19 Months Patty Hearst Was Kidnapped Were Like. Grunge.Com. <https://www.grunge.com/213892/what-the-19-months-patty-hearst-was-kidnapped-were-like/>
- Bhui, K., Otis, M., Silva, M. J., Halvorsrud, K., Freestone, M., & Jones, E. (2020). Extremism and common mental illness: Cross-sectional community survey of White British and Pakistani men and women living in England. *The British Journal of Psychiatry*, 217(4), 547–554. <https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.2019.14>
- Bjørge, T. (2005). Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward. Routledge.
- Blair, G., Christine Fair, C., Malhotra, N., & Shapiro, J. N. (2013). Poverty and Support for Militant Politics: Evidence from Pakistan: Poverty and support for militant politics. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(1), 30–48. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00604.x>
- Borum, R. (2004). Psychology of Terrorism. Mental Health Law & Policy Faculty Publications. https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/mhlp_facpub/571

- Borum, R. (2010). Understanding Terrorist Psychology. In A. Silke, *The Psychology of Counter-terrorism* (pp. 19–33). Mental Health Law & Policy Faculty Publications.
- Castano, E., & Giner-Sorolla, R. (2006). Not quite human: Infrahumanization in response to collective responsibility for intergroup killing. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 90, 804–818. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.90.5.804>
- Crenshaw, M. (1985). An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism. *Orbis*, 29(3).
- Crenshaw, M. (1988). The Subjective Reality of the Terrorist: Ideological and psychological factors in terrorism. In R. O. Slater & M. Stohl, *Current Perspectives in International Terrorism*. Macmillan.
- Cuddy, A. J., Rock, M. S., & Norton, Michal I. (2008). Aid in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina: Inferences of Secondary Emotions and Intergroup Helping. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, 10(1), 107–118.
- de la Corte, L. (2007). Explaining Terrorism: A Psychosocial Approach. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 1(2). <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26298293>
- Denoeux, G., & Carter, L. (2009). *Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Guide to Programming*. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.
- Dodd, V., & Khomani, N. (2015, July 3). Two Bethnal Green schoolgirls ‘now married to Isis men’ in Syria. *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/04/two-bethnal-green-schoolgirls-now-married-isis-men-syria>
- Doherty, C. (2014, June 12). Polarization in American politics. Pew Research Center. <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/12/7-things-to-know-about-polarization-in-america/>
- Donovan, J., & Coupe, R. T. (2013). Animal rights extremism: Victimization, investigation and detection of a campaign of criminal intimidation. *European Journal of Criminology*, 10(1), 113–132. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370812460609>
- Fromkin, D. (1975). The Strategy of Terrorism. *Foreign Affairs*, 53(4), 683–698.
- Funke, M., Schularick, M., & Trebesch, C. (2016). Going to extremes: Politics after financial crises, 1870–2014. *European Economic Review*, 88(C), 227–260.
- Gabbatt, A. (2015, June 16). Donald Trump’s tirade on Mexico’s ‘drugs and rapists’ outrages US Latinos. *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/16/donald-trump-mexico-presidential-speech-latino-hispanic>
- Grusin, R. (2010). *Premeditation: Affect and Mediality After 9/11* (2010th edition). Palgrave Macmillan.

- Hogg, M. A. (2000). Subjective Uncertainty Reduction through Self-categorization: A Motivational Theory of Social Identity Processes. *European Review of Social Psychology*, 11(1), 223–255. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14792772043000040>
- Hogg, M. A. (2011). Self-Uncertainty, Social Identity, and the Solace of Extremism. In *Extremism and the Psychology of Uncertainty* (pp. 19–35). Blackwell Publishing.
- Hogg, M. A., & Blaylock, D. L. (Eds.). (2011). *Extremism and the Psychology of Uncertainty* (1st edition). Wiley-Blackwell.
- Jackson, R., Jarvis, L., Gunning, J., & Breen-Smyth, M. (2011). *Terrorism: A Critical Introduction* (2011th edition). Red Globe Press.
- Jost, J. T., & Napier, J. L. (2011). The Uncertainty-Threat Model of Political Conservatism. In M. A. Hogg & D. A. Blaylock, *Extremism and the Psychology of Uncertainty* (pp. 90–111).
- Juergensmeyer, M. (2003). *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. University of California Press.
- Koehler, D. (2020). Violent extremism, mental health and substance abuse among adolescents: Towards a trauma psychological perspective on violent radicalization and deradicalization. *The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology*, 31(3), 455–472. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14789949.2020.1758752>
- Krasenberg, J., & Wouterse, L. (2019). Understanding the mental health disorders pathway leading to violent extremism. Radicalisation Awareness Network.
- Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, M. J., Bélanger, J. J., Sheveland, A., Hetiarachchi, M., & Gunaratna, R. (2014). The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism. *Political Psychology*, 35(S1), 69–93. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12163>
- Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. M. (1996). Motivated Closing of the Mind: ‘Siezing’ and ‘freezing’. *Psychological Review*, 103, 263–283.
- Landau, M. J., Rothschild, Z. K., & Sullivan, D. (2011). The Extremism of Everyday Life: Fetishism as a defense against existential uncertainty. In *Extremism and the Psychology of Uncertainty* (pp. 131–146). Blackwell Publishing.
- Maalouf, A. (2001). *In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong*. Arcade Publishing.
- Maoz, I., Ward, A., Katz, M., & Ross, L. (2002). Reactive Devaluation of an “Israeli” vs. “Palestinian” Peace Proposal. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 46(4), 515–546. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002702046004003>
- Marone, F. (2017). Ties that Bind: Dynamics of Group Radicalisation in Italy’s Jihadists Headed for Syria and Iraq. *The International Spectator*, 52(3), 48–63.

- McCaughey, C. R. (2002). The Psychology of Terrorism. <http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/mccauley.htm>
- Merolla, J. L., Ramos, J. M., & Zechmeister, E. J. (2011). Authoritarianism, Need for Closure and Conditions of Threat. In M. A. Hogg & D. A. Blaylock, *Extremism and the Psychology of Uncertainty* (pp. 212–227). Blackwell Publishing.
- Moghaddam, F. M. (2006). *From the Terrorist's Point of View: What they experience and why they come to destroy*. Praeger Security International.
- Moghaddam, F. M., & Love, K. (2011). Collective Uncertainty and Extremism: A further discussion on the collective roots of subjective experience. In M. A. Hogg & D. L. Blaylock, *Extremism and the Psychology of Uncertainty* (pp. 246–262). Blackwell Publishing.
- Mostofa, S. M. (2019). A Study of Al-Qaeda's Propaganda Narratives in Bangladesh. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 11(2). <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26627976>
- Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Social Security. (2014). *Action plan against Radicalisation and Violent Extremism*. 34.
- Pretus, C., Hamid, N., Sheikh, H., Ginges, J., Tobeña, A., Davis, R., Vilarroya, O., & Atran, S. (2018). Neural and Behavioral Correlates of Sacred Values and Vulnerability to Violent Extremism. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 9. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02462>
- Sageman, M. (2004). *Understanding Terror Networks*. University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Saxena, S., & Bhattacharya, S. (2020, June 9). Here's how to prepare for the coming mental health crisis. World Economic Forum. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/06/a-mental-health-crisis-is-brewing-heres-how-we-should-prepare/>
- Siegel, J. T., Crano, W. D., Alvaro, E. M., Lac, A., Rast, D., & Kettering, V. (2011). Dying to be Popular: A purposive explanation of adolescent willingness to endure harm. In M. A. Hogg & D. L. Blaylock, *Extremism and the Psychology of Uncertainty* (pp. 113–130). Blackwell Publishing.
- Spalek, B., & Imtoul, A. (2007). Muslim Communities and Counter-Terror Responses: "Hard" Approaches to Community Engagement in the UK and Australia. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 27(2), 185–202. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13602000701536117>
- Spalek, B., & Lambert, R. (2008). Muslim communities, counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation: A critically reflective approach to engagement. *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice*, 36(4), 257–270. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlcj.2008.08.004>
- Standing, G. (2011). *The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class* (1st edition). Bloomsbury Academic.

- Stets, J. E., & Burke, P. J. (2000). Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 63(3), 224–237.
- Steven, G. C. S., & Gunaratna, R. (2004). *Counter-Terrorism: A Reference Handbook* (M. Vasan, Ed.). ABC-CLIO.
- Tabachnick, T. (2019, November 14). She was ‘a neo-Nazi skinhead’. *Pittsburgh Jewish Chronicle*. <https://jewishchronicle.timesofisrael.com/she-was-a-neo-nazi-skinhead/>
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The Social Identity Theory of Inter-Group Behaviour. In S. Worchel & L. W. Austin, *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Nelson Hall.
- The Scotsman. (2008, December 17). Glasgow Airport bombing: Doctor behind terror attack is jailed for life. <https://www.scotsman.com/news/glasgow-airport-bombing-doctor-behind-terror-attack-jailed-life-2510231>
- Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1986). Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions. *The Journal of Business*, 59(4), S251–S278.
- van Prooijen, J.-W., & Krouwel, A. P. M. (2019). Psychological Features of Extreme Political Ideologies. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 28(2), 159–163. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721418817755>
- Vultee, F., & Balzacq, T. (2010). Securitization as a media frame: What happens when the media ‘speak security’. In *Securitization Theory: How security problems emerge and dissolve* (pp. 91–107). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203868508-12>
- Wending, M. (2021, January 6). QAnon: What is it and where did it come from? *BBC News*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/53498434>
- Wiktorowicz, Q. (2005). *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Wilson, C. (2017, December 8). Judge Unseals MAX Train Stabbing Suspect’s Mental Health Evaluation. *Opb*. <https://www.opb.org/news/article/jeremy-christian-mental-health-evaluation/>
- Windisch, S., Simi, P., Blee, K., & DeMichele, M. (2020). Measuring the Extent and Nature of Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) among Former White Supremacists. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 0(0), 1–22. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2020.1767604>