REHABILITATION COUNTRY PROFILES
Somalia’s troubled history
Somalia has experienced political turmoil since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 when descended into a prolonged period of political instability involving clan warfare, piracy, and the emergence of various armed factions. The most impactful of these is Al-Shabaab, meaning ‘the youth’, which was initially a faction of the military wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), an organization which was formed in 2004.
The ICU gained public support by restoring law and order in Mogadishu, and then expanded across South-Central Somalia. At one point, it was the strongest political and military force in the country. As such, its collapse in 2006 left a power vacuum in Somalia. Al-Shabaab shifted its focus to driving out Ethiopian forces, capitalising on nationalist sentiments among Somalis. From 2010 onwards, internal rifts led to territorial losses; al-Shabaab then formalised ties with al-Qaeda in 2012, increasing its global appeal and networking capacity. In 2017, Somalia ranked in sixth place as the country most impacted by terrorism, a year in which an al-Shabaab suicide bomber killed 587 people in Mogadishu.
Al-Shabaab on the retreat
Since 2023, al-Shabaab has been expelled from many towns and villages in Somalia, coinciding with the reinstatement of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud for his second term. President Mohamud declared a ‘total war’ against al-Shabaab, deploying Somali National Army forces against them. The international community, including the US, UK, EU, Eritrea, and Turkey, provided training for the Somali security forces.
Al-Shabaab’s weak current position may increase the likelihood of disengagement from the group. The desire to avoid harm has been identified as a common reason for leaving al-Shabaab. Research suggests that individuals who disengaged from al-Shabaab were motivated by the potential for state amnesty, the desire to reunite with their families, and the hope of improved personal safety, better living conditions and improved prospects for their livelihoods. Unemployment – possibly the world’s highest level – contributes to extremism among Somalis in both Somalia and Kenya, with high unemployment rates among young Somalis. Many former fighters also express distaste for the organisation’s brutality. Many combatants did not join willingly in the first instance, but were coerced into doing so.
Programme developments
The Federal Government of Somalia initiated a national programme as part of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) agenda supported by the UN and donor community in 2012. This was designed to reintegrate low-risk disengaged al-Shabaab combatants back into society. Several facilities were established, with varying success. The Serendi Centre in Mogadishu, which was run by a Somali in partnership with a Danish deradicalisation expert. This project faced criticism from Somali government leaders, local elders, religious leaders and DDR experts for its lack of transparency, human rights violations, and was criticised for the treatment of inmates, especially minors. A new contractor took over in 2015. Despite improvements, but the centre still struggles with a poor reputation. Meanwhile, a German-funded facility in Baidoa gradually expanded and gained greater prominence. Smaller deradicalisation centres were also established in Belet Weyne and Kismayo with funding from the UK Government and the regional state.
These centres combine DDR and CVE efforts in a ‘second generation’ approach, tailoring their activities for disengaged al-Shabaab members.
Second generation DDR
Typically, DDR programmes have been implemented in post-conflict situations to reintegrate ex-combatants. The concept of DDR has expanded to allow it do be utilised in broader peacebuilding activities, counter-insurgency operations and stability operations. It is now becoming more closely aligned with counterterrorism and anti-crime measures, as a preventative approach.
DDR programmes were not originally designed to address ideologically based radicalisation or to provide preventive interventions to individuals deemed to be at risk of radicalisation. As efforts in preventing and countering violent extremism became more developed, however, there was a reevaluation of how DDR programmes could be applied to members of violent extremist groups. This shift is referred to as ‘second generation’ DDR.
This reflects the evolution of DDR programmes and their adaptation to address the complex challenges posed by violent extremism. It recognises the need to address both the disarmament and reintegration aspects of individuals who have been radicalised or are at risk of becoming extremists. The broader approach aims to promote security, development, and counterterrorism efforts in conjunction with DDR activities. In Somalia, this resulted in the concept of ‘Demobilization and Disengagement from Violent Extremism’ (DDVE).
Implementation
District Peace Committees were established in each locality. These committees were comprised of a diverse group of participants, including young people, parents, women, private sector representatives, civil society organizations, religious leaders, traditional elders, members of the internally displaced community and individuals from the justice system, correctional facilities, and police departments. Although efforts were made to achieve gender balance, none of the participating cities were able to fully accomplish this.
Somali women’s groups have actively opposed al-Shabaab’s recruitment efforts and extremist ideologies. Women can play a crucial role in preventing extremism, due to their close relationships with their children and young people, allowing them to detect concerning behavioural changes at an early stage. Women are often directly affected by violent Islamic extremism, either as victims themselves or as parents of children who are drawn into extremism and are as such motivated to intervene, and can be particularly useful if they are able to mobilise civil society, bridge clan divisions and serve as channels for dialogue between conflicting parties.
Additionally, Resource Centres for Peace were established and managed by the DPCs. These centres included classrooms, facilities for teachers and students, and spaces for dining and sports activities. The centres received partial support from the district authorities, both in terms of in-kind contributions and financial assistance, as well as from international donors.
Reintegration through community activities
The majority of Somali programmes involve the internment of defected al-Shabaab members. Many live in camps where they are inactive and prone to addiction to khat, a narcotic plant native to eastern and southern Africa. Community programmes, such as cultural events and youth projects, were implemented in Baidoa and Kismayo. Music, drama, art, and cultural activities hold significant potential in countering extremism. Al-Shabaab banned recreational activities, including sports, films, and music. These form alternative outlets for expression and engagement and an engagement with more pluralist narratives. The strong oral tradition and distinctive rhythms of Somali songs can effectively spread positive messages, particularly when amplified via new media. Somali athletes like Mo Farah and Abdisalam Ibrahim serve as positive role models, demonstrating the transformative power of sports. Team sports can provide the sense of purpose and social bonding that is found within extremist organizations.
Role of community figures
Local, elders, religious leaders (sheikhs), and civil society groups have become increasingly involved in the country’s deradicalisation agenda. Elders, in particular, have acted as an informal early warning mechanism, identifying and directing vulnerable youths towards the newly established programmes. Dispute settlement, traditionally within their purview, was now being delivered by jihadis. Additionally, state structures and institutions had limited power and lack legitimacy in many regions of Somalia, meaning that elders and sheikhs could take on these roles more effectively. In semi-territorial areas of Somalia where the government and other structures are weak, the involvement of elders and sheikhs remains crucial due to their local, embedded knowledge.
Government officials actively engaged with community leaders, creating a list of religious leaders deemed suitable for CVE work, including bridging the interests of donors, UN agencies, and government actors within rural areas. The involvement of elders and religious leaders in CVE brokerage has gradually transformed Somali societal structures. Traditionally, religious leaders were seen as neutral arbiters in conflicts, while clan leaders acted as mediators rather than political figures. However, their roles have become hybridised and merged with the demands of the DDVE programme for which there is no local precedent. This hybrid position holds potential risks, as some elders and sheikhs may use their influence in their own interests, and some relationships may be leveraged in the interests of political elites at regional and international levels.
Seizing the opportunity
The current weakness of al-Shabaab presents an opportunity for Somalia to create positive change. Policymakers and practitioners must be cautious of potential pitfalls that could discourage disengagement. These include ensuring compliance with human rights standards, maintaining transparency and consistency in eligibility criteria, and considering the scalability of programmes if the rate of disengagements increases rapidly. The potential of the existing programme can be boosted through messaging to convince those still within al-Shabaab that leaving is a risk worth taking, It also necessitates securitising locations where deradicalisation programmes are conducted. A lack of community acceptance can undermine reintegration, and this can be particularly sensitive in areas which have been victimized by al-Shabaab. There is a need to generate community acceptance through reconciliation and consultation within the community. Lastly, the impacts of the programme would be boosted via a holistic approach which provides a spectrum of opportunities for individual rehabilitation.