REHABILITATION COUNTRY PROFILES
The legacy of institutionalised Islamism
Pakistan has grappled with militancy for decades, a situation which has only escalated after it became involved in the War on Terror. Its unstable and chaotic politics have hindered disengagement and deradicalisation efforts. A particular hindrance has been the institutionalisation of the ‘Islamisation’ of Pakistan, which has deeply intertwined radicalisation and religious extremism via school curricula, the legal system, the media promotion and the influence of religious scholars, clerics, and seminaries.
This policy was first initiated by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan with the goal of countering Pashtun nationalism. However, his effforts counter-productively led to the development of seminaries and training grounds used by Afghan militants. General Zia-ul-Haq vigorously pursued the agenda of Islamising Pakistan, including supporting Islamist rebels in Afghanistan – an act for which Pakistan was in receipt of covert American assistance for over a decade. Political allies such as Jamaat-e-Islami also produced militant literature and recruited fighters for the anti-Soviet insurgency in Afghanistan.
Pakistani seminaries enrolled Afghan and Pakistani children as students and soldiers, indoctrinating them with militant ideas of jihad. After the Soviet-Afghan war, Pakistan redirected its efforts towards launching a covert war in Indian Jammu & Kashmir, leading to the emergence of Islamist militant groups and the creation of networks involved in generating funds, spreading radical literature and recruiting soldiers.
This main-streaming of militant violence has created a challenging environment for Pakistan’s efforts towards deradicalisation. In recent years, there has been a shift in approach, led by the Pakistan Army, towards prevention and deradicalisation. These efforts tend to target individuals on the periphery of militancy, rather than those actively involved in carrying out violent attacks.
The role of education in radicalisation and deradicalisation
Since the 9/11 attacks, Islamic religious schools have faced particular scrutiny for their alleged association with Islamist terrorism. Some of these indeed have direct links to militant groups, yet this is unlikely to be the sole source of extremism in Pakistan. It is estimated that between 10 – 18% of these establishments are affiliated with militant groups, as well as Islamist insurgencies in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Pakistan. Extrapolating from that figure implies that there could be as many as 4,500 schools which present a radicalisation risk. Despite their limited presence they thus can still have a significant impact on radicalism and militancy, even though only 7% of Pakistani villages hosts a madrassa, and madrassas comprise less than 1% of national school enrolment.
Another issue is the large population of children who are unable to access any form of education at all. In 2021, Pakistan’s population of children not in school was described as the second largest in the world after Nigeria. Some 22.8 million children may therefore lack the cognitive tools to interrogate extremist ideas, as well as the practical skills and qualifications to progress beyond menial labour, which may limit their ambitions, leading to resentment and a vulnerability to extremism.
Deradicalisation in the Swat valley
Pakistan’s Swat region has become a source go concern for the Pakistan Army, due to the strong influence of the Taliban in the region. Local Islamist group Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) became affiliated to Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in 2007 under its leader Mullah Fazlullah. The government granted TNSM de facto control over Swat Valley, allowing them to implement their version of sharia law in the region. In order to reclaim control, he military launched Operation Rah-e-Rast in 2009, ultimately resulting in Fazlullah’s flight and the capture of Taliban commanders.
The Pakistan Army then established deradicalisation centres to rehabilitate former militants, focusing on adult detainees. The Swat programme provides formal education from grades 1 to 12, aiming to foster critical thinking and prepare individuals for higher education. It also promotes informed perspectives on the world and teaches religious pluralism and tolerance. Vocational training is another key component, equipping individuals with practical skills in various fields to enhance their employability and discourage them from pursuing violence. The goal is to provide them with income opportunities to support themselves and their families. These programmes are implemented through a public-private partnership, with overall supervision from the Pakistan army.
These centres employ a combination of therapy, religious education, vocational training, and formal education in order to provide alternatives for radicalised individuals. They target individuals on the periphery of militancy, rather than those actively involved in carrying out violent attacks.
Mishal: Military led programme for adults
Mishal (meaning Torch of Light) was established in 2010 by the Pakistani military, and is exclusively run by the military. Financial support is provided by the government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly known as the North West Frontier Province). Although the programme is primarily overseen by the military, there are limited roles for civilian staff. This includes a psychologist, a social module instructor, and vocational training instructors.
Participants in Project Mishal are men between eighteen and fifty years old. Coercion and familial ties to militant groups are common reasons cited for engagement with the Taliban. Unlike other programmes that solely rely on religious scholars, Mishal’s program assigns psychologists to former jihadists. Psychologists, both civilian and military, assess individuals who joined militancy, including their reasons, ideological orientation, and religious beliefs. The counselling process involves one-on-one meetings with psychologists, interviews with the individual’s family and community, and understanding their life story and motives for joining militancy.
Individuals in the deradicalisation program share common features related to their psychological, socio-economic, and ideological backgrounds: low socioeconomic status, broken family structures with little supervision, a history of childhood physical abuse, strict and negligent parenting and/or teaching and the lack of formal or informal education. Based on psychological assessments, common personal traits among these individuals include a lack of critical thinking, emotional instability, anxiety disorders and depression, inferiority complex, revenge-seeking behaviour, and a tendency to seek authority.
Sabaoon: NGO support for youth
The Sabaoon (meaning First Ray of Dawn) Centre for Rehabilitation was operated by the Hum Pakistani Foundation in collaboration with the Pakistan army, and started in 2009. It is now managed by a civilian administration, with Dr. Feriha Peracha as the Director. The facility claims to have served over 240 youth and successfully reintegrated 219 individuals so far.
It aims to deradicalise, rehabilitate, and reintegrate underage militants associated with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) provides financial assistance to the centre. Many of the boys were recruited through coercive and incentive-based tactics employed by the militants, such as kidnapping, forced conscription offers of food and the prospect of social prestige.
The rehabilitation program categorises child soldiers into low-risk, medium-risk, and high-risk based on psychological evaluations and their prior involvement with militant activities. Sabaoon provides formal education, vocational training, counselling and therapy, and social modules to address the psychological, health, and emotional problems of the boys. The curriculum promotes tolerance, religious pluralism, and re-education on issues related to sharia, jihad and democracy. This involves referencing the Quran, interpreting verses within their context, and considering the historical significance of revelations.
The reintegration process assesses educational performance, vocational skills, psychosocial assessments and the family’s level of engagement with the child. Monitoring is implemented to prevent recidivism, and military officers regularly check on the reintegrated children for a period of two years. Progress is measured by academic or vocational achievements, the ability to embrace corrective religious instruction, such as understanding Islam’s essence, and developing qualities like kindness and tolerance.
In-depth discussions are held to explore the factors that motivated their participation and the mode of involvement, often involving religious scholars to address these issues on an individual basis. Psychosocial interventions also focuse on helping individuals reframe their experiences. This includes addressing misconceptions and promoting critical thinking. Sabaoon claims success based on attitudinal and behavioural shifts observed in the reintegrated children, their engagement in constructive activities, and the absence of known recidivism cases.
Outcomes
The programme developed in Swat was later expanded to Punjab and FATA. The initiative in FATA aims to rehabilitate militants from various local Taliban groups, whereas in Punjab the targetted terrorist groups are Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. Despite these efforts, Pakistan still a long way to go in addressing the drivers of radicalization and implementing comprehensive deradicalisation efforts throughout the country. Current efforts are limited in scope and primarily focused on vulnerable areas or regions where military operations have been conducted. Given that radicalisation is a significant issue in Pakistan, there is a need for a national, rather than merely regional, strategy which is planned rather than responsive. Also, the unclear ownership of projects which poised between the army and NGOs may impede clear standards of measurement and communication.
Another criticism is that these programmes focus upon low-ranked members of radical organisations, with less facility for deradicalisation of extremist leaders. The sustainability of these programmes is not guaranteed, and there is a risk that they will lose momentum. A holistic approach that combines both militant rehabilitation and broader counter-radicalisation policies is essential for long-term success. The root causes of radicalisation, such as governance issues and socioeconomic disparities, must also be addressed. Limited resources and motivational obstacles further impede the success of de-radicalisation efforts. Strong monitoring institutions and think tanks should play a more active role, and strategies to prevent re-engagement and recidivism need development.