REHABILITATION COUNTRY PROFILES
Boko Haram and other extremist groups in Nigeria
Boko Haram, which emerged in the late 1990s in Nigeria, is one of the world’s deadliest terrorist organisations, responsible for over 17,000 deaths and 2.2 million displacements. These have occurred primarily in the north-east of Nigeria, and Borno State in particular. The organisation has targeted Muslims and Christians alike, carrying out bombings, abductions, and suicide bombings.
In 2014, Boko Haram declared an Islamic caliphate and took control of vast areas in northeastern Nigeria before being pushed back by a military offensive. A faction later pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and became known as the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Despite Nigeria’s military efforts, Boko Haram continues to pose a potent security threat. There have also been instances of extremist groups emerging in predominantly Christian areas of the south. These groups include the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra, the Ijaw Youth Council of the Niger Delta, the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra, and the Niger Delta Avengers.
Counter-terrorism responses
Nigeria’s counter-terrorism activities were established through the Terrorism Prevention Act of 2011, and amended in 2013. The Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) was tasked with coordinating security and enforcement agencies, providing support to prevent and combat terrorism, formulating and implementing a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, and enhancing the capacity of relevant security and intelligence services.
In 2015, President Muhammadu Buhari pledged to tackle corruption and defeat the extremist group Boko Haram within six months of his administration. However, Boko Haram and ISWAP continue to carry out violent attacks on civilians and military installations. The military’s approach, characterized by human rights abuses and heavy-handed tactics, has been criticised for exacerbating the conflict and radicalising young people, emphasising the need for a softer, more inclusive approach to address the crisis.
The failings of the military approach led to the identification of the need for a ‘soft approach’ to counter-terrorism. The programme they developed comprised three main components: counter-radicalisation, strategic communications, and deradicalisation. Deradicalisation, rehabilitation, and reintegration has become a key focus of President Buhari’s counterterrorism efforts.
Challenges of deradicalisation programme
The Nigerian Government implemented a counterterrorism framework called ‘Operation Safe Corridor’ prioritising the deradicalisation, rehabilitation, and reintegration of individuals who have defected from Boko Haram. There were significant challenges in implementing the programme in prisons, due to poor conditions, a lack of infrastructure and resources. The objectives included identifying the root causes of radicalisation, developing effective strategies, changing attitudes and perceptions of potential recruits, communicating positive messages, assessing the impact of insurgency on affected communities and creating opportunities and restoring faith in the government among these communities.
Starting a prison intervention from scratch
The Nigerian Prisons Service had limited experience in establishing and running rehabilitation programs, particularly in the context of deradicalisation. ONSA sought technical assistance from the European Union to redress this. One particularly significant venture was a prison-based rehabilitation programme. The EU assisted with the design of a basic deradicalisation model, providing training to prison personnel, developing risk assessment and case management tools and creating a detailed deradicalisation training manual. The programme was initially implemented in Kuje medium security prison, which was upgraded to accommodate the project.
Efforts were made to create a supportive operational environment within the prison. Regular team meetings, case reviews and intervention conferences were conducted to discuss progress, address challenges and share experiences. Accurate and accessible files were maintained on violent extremist prisoners in order to measure the impact of interventions. A weekly timetable of activities was devised to deliver interventions to the prisoners.
Training in Kuje
The Kuje approach involved a prisoner-centred, multidisciplinary approach where personnel from different backgrounds worked together using a common framework. Local Treatment Teams were made responsible for risk assessments, interventions, handling case file records and delivering the programme.
The European Union Technical Assistance provided coaching, mentoring and training for the Treatment Teams throughout the pilot program. Existing personnel from within the prison service were chosen to run the deradicalisation programme. A selection process identified personnel with the necessary skills, including imams, pastors, teachers, vocational instructors, art therapists, psychologists and medical personnel. Prison staff who were faith leaders in their communities were deployed to Kuje. All staff members underwent careful vetting by the government and secure accommodation was provided to ensure their security. A distinctive jacket was provided to create a common identity for the team when working in the prison.
Implementation
Forty-five adult male violent extremist prisoners were selected to participate in the pilot. Most were pre-trial detainees at low levels of their groups; a majority were Muslims, married, and had at least a secondary school education. The Treatment Team overcame initial resistance by addressing prisoners basic needs. Formal risk assessments were conducted at least every six months, and supplemented with information gathered through interviews, observations, records, and other sources. These provided a means to evaluate progress and tailor interventions.
Prisoners were found to have some similarities such as socioeconomic marginalisation, discrimination, human rights violations, corruption, victimisation, distortion of religious or political beliefs and the influence of charismatic leaders and/or social networks. Some individuals had been coerced, pressured, or deceived into joining violent extremist groups by community members.
Intervention styles
Interventions involved group activities, while others were conducted on an individual basis by team members, including faith leaders, psychologists, and social workers. The techniques were:
→ Engaging prisoners in one-on-one conversations that challenge their beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour;
→ Vocational training and work experience;
→ Education and cultural activities, including literacy and numeracy;
→ Art therapy such as music and dance;
→ Sports and games to promote personal development, pro-social thinking and behaviour;
→ Interventions focused on countering extremist religious ideologies;
→ Psychological and counselling interventions, based on individual risk assessments.
Other factors such as substance abuse and mental health conditions were also addressed by specialist personnel to ensure prisoners’ ability to engage in the deradicalisation program. The scheduling and delivery of interventions evolved based on the Treatment Team’s experience, understanding of the prisoners, and their level of engagement.
Outcomes
The goal of the prison-based deradicalisation program was to change the beliefs, views, values, and attitudes of violent extremist prisoners rather than just changing their behaviour. However, measuring this kind of change is challenging. Several indicators were used, including changes in prisoners’ behaviour, their level of engagement with the interventions, the number of institutional incidents, and the number of interventions completed. Early reports indicated a lowering of risks across various indicators for many prisoners. However, the ultimate test of success lies in the post-release outcomes of prisoners. Desistance from violence is the desired outcome, but measuring it is complex, relying on indicators such as re-offending, reconviction or potentially for re-imprisonment for extremist offences.
It is important to tailor the rehabilitation process to each individual, taking into account their specific needs. Some who joined for non-religious reasons or played minor roles within the group may benefit from vocational training and psycho-social support to reintegrate into society successfully. On the other hand, those who joined primarily for religious motives may benefit from focussed rehabilitation efforts. Efficient post-release monitoring is crucial, as it mitigates potential security risks and captures the performance of the programme over the long-term. The programme has also improved relationships between extremist prisoners and general prison staff, reducing tensions within the prison population. The current counter-terrorism framework incorporates elements pioneered the Kuje pilot, specifically the religious interventions.
Public hostility to resettlement
However, the impact of the programme cannot be measured outside the prison setting, because detainees who have completed the deradicalisation process are often not released but held back in detention facilities.
Residents of areas targetted by Boko Haram are sceptical around accepting former fighters back into their communities; there is particular resentment amongst those living in deepest poverty in refugee camps after enduring Boko Haram’s violence, who resent the fact taht meagre state resources are seen to be channelled towards combatants rather than victims. This hostility also applies non-combatant individuals, such as abducted women and girls, who face stigmatisation and suspicion upon their return to their communities. Some rehabilitated women have been completely rejected by residents, labelled as ‘Boko Haram wives.’ Male ex-fighters are likely to receive even more hostility. The government has done little to reassure these public concerns.
President Buhari’s 2018 acceptance of unconditional surrender of any Boko Haram member implied possible pardons for both low-risk and high-risk members raised concerns of offering impunity to combatants.
Criticisms of the programme
Some argue that encouraging repentance and embracing peace for former Boko Haram fighters is a valid approach, citing past instances of amnesty granted to individuals who have committed serious crimes. There are debates around the necessity and success of deradicalisation initiatives, with concerns about recidivism rates. The effectiveness of programs prioritising ideological change is particularly questionable, as their impact upon the risk of individuals re-offending is unclear. The President of the Christian Association of Nigeria questioned the guarantee that these individuals would not return to violence and pose a threat to innocent Nigerians. The governor of Borno State Governor was concerned that released prisoner might continue working with extremist groups as spies.
Nigeria lacks the necessary infrastructure and monitoring capabilities to ensure that released prisoners do not drift back into violence. Public hostility, infrastructure limitations, and monitoring gaps contribute to the complexity of the situation.